At the heart of natural language processing is the understanding of context dependent meanings. This paper presents a preliminary model of formal contexts based on situation theory. It also gives a worked-out example to show the use of contexts in lifting, i.e., how propositions holding in a particular context transform when they are moved to another context. This is useful in NLP applications where preserving meaning is a desideratum.
INTRODUCTION
Our long-term goal is to o er a full-edged formalization of context, one that can be used, among other areas, in natural language processing. In this paper, which can be regarded as a tentative step towards that end, we will identify the role of context in language and take a look at some salient e orts in (logical) AI treating formal contexts. In general, the focus of our discussion will be McCarthy's proposal (McCarthy 1987 (McCarthy , 1993 , which is the groundwork for all ensuing logicist formalizations. While the main purpose of McCarthy, viz. a mechanism by which we can build AI systems which are not forever stuck with the concepts they use at a given time (because they can surpass the context they are in), is still largely unful lled, we will see that important advances have been made (Guha 1991; Shoham 1991; McCarthy and S. Buva c 1994; S. Buva c and Mason 1995; Attardi and Simi 1995) .
Our model of context, on the other hand, is inspired by the pioneering work of on conditionals, and will be presented using the notation and terminology of situation theory (Barwise and Perry 1983; Devlin 1991) . After giving the minimum background to situation theory, we will state this model and discuss an application of it in lifting, i.e., the process of computing what is true in one context based on what is true in another context (McCarthy and S. . The situation theoretic model has notable properties such as partiality, dynamic contexts, and natural language support. It links our work with NLP in a simple, natural way: reasoning is essential for NLP, knowledge representation is a prerequisite for any kind of reasoning, and situation theory can be used both as a KR scheme and to support contextual reasoning. 1
CONTEXT IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
\You shall know a word by the company it keeps." This remark of J. R. Firth, famed British linguist, seems to us an apt reminder for the ubiquity of context. According to Crystal (1991, p. 78) ,`context' is a general term in linguistics and phonetics to refer to speci c parts of an utterance (or text) near or adjacent to a unit (e.g., a sound, word) which is the focus of attention. The occurrence of a unit is partly or wholly determined by its context, which is speci ed in terms of the unit's relations. Blackburn (1994, p. 80) o ers a similar de nition: \In linguistics, context is the parts of an utterance surrounding a unit and which may a ect both its meaning and its grammatical contribution." However, he is quick to add that context also refers to \the wider situation, either of the speaker or of the surroundings, that may play a part in determining the signi cance of a saying." Leech (1981, pp. 66{67) notes that the speci cation of context (whether linguistic or nonlinguistic) has the e ect of narrowing down the communicative possibilities of a message. This particularization of meaning can take place in assorted ways, including: (i) elimination of certain ambiguities or multiple meanings in the message, (ii) clari cation of the referents of deictics and de nite descriptions, (iii) supplying of information which the writer has omitted through ellipsis, (iv) interpretation of tense, and (v) determination of the scope of quanti ers.
It is standard nowadays to use the term`co-text' for the narrow, purely linguistic context (Lyons 1995, p. 271) . As for the total nonlinguistic background to an utterance (including: the immediate situation in which it is used, the knowledge of speaker and hearer about the commonsense world, the knowledge of what has been said earlier, the relevant beliefs and presuppositions of speaker and hearer), the term situational context' has been o ered (Crystal 1991, p. 79) . Similarly, Lyons (1995, p. 271) uses the term`context of situation' as a synonym for situational context. He believes that natural language meaning must be studied as a multiple phenomenon, its numerous aspects being relatable to (i) di erent levels of linguistic analysis, and (ii) features of the world.
Being one of those linguistic abstractions which is constantly used in all kinds of contexts sic] but never explained, the establishment of relevant context in NLP is traditionally seen as a formidable problem. M. Pinkal voices this di culty in a vivid passage that appears in (Asher and Simpson 1994, p. 733): Aside from the surrounding deictic coordinates, aside from the immediate linguistic co-text and accompanying gestural expressions at closer view, the following determinants can in uence the attribution of sense: the entire frame of interaction, the individual biographies of the participants, the physical environment, the social embedding, the cultural and historical background, and|in addition to all these|facts and dates no matter how far removed in dimensions of time and space. Roughly speaking,`context' can be the whole world in relation to an utterance act.
But observations such as these also show that the quest for idealized, contextindependent meaning (which goes under the name`logical form' in semantics) is seriously misdirected. The importance of ist(c; p) for NLP can be seen by noticing that while the set of propositions true in a context may be nite, the collection of natural language sentences that can express these propositions will be in nite (McCarthy 1996) . This is especially crucial in translation tasks, e.g., interpreting a source language sentence and constructing an equivalent target language sentence. For typical translation tasks, the target sentence must succeed in communicating the propositional content of the original sentence, and having propositions (rather than sentences) as the basic building blocks helps in this endeavor (Farwell and Helmreich 1995) . Contexts are` rst-class citizens.' We can use contexts in our logical formulas in the same way we use other objects. In other words, contexts are formal objects in the semantics: they can be denoted by constants in the logical language and when necessary, variables can range over them.
Each context has a vocabulary associated with it. Thus, a given statement may not be expressible in some context (due to the impoverished vocabulary of that context). In yet another context it would be expressed di erently. It is noted that since there is no absolute outermost context, it is necessary to have an adequate notion of transcendence, i.e., outstripping the outermost context so far referred to. Transcendence is the way to relax or modify some assumptions of an old context; it is essentially a move from a context that makes certain assumptions to one that does not .
In order to implement transcendence, an appropriate set of nonmonotonic rules for lifting sentences to broader contexts is required. By lifting a predicate (or formula, axiom, etc.) from one context to another related context, we mean transferring that predicate (or formula, axiom, etc.) to broader contexts|those involving fewer assumptions. As an illustration of lifting, consider the relation`more general than' ( ). The inequality c 1 c 2 states that c 2 is more general than c 1 (equivalently, c 1 is a specialization of c 2 ). Essentially, c 2 involves no more assumptions than c 1 . Using , a fact from a context to one of its super-contexts can be lifted via the lifting rule 8c 1 8c 2 8p (c 1 c 2 )^ist(c 1 ; p)^:ab(p; c 1 ; c 2 ) ! ist(c 2 ; p) where p is a proposition of c 1 and ab is an abnormality predicate to support nonmonotonicity.
When we regard contexts in the natural deduction sense|as McCarthy (1987) suggested|the operations of entering and leaving a context might be given succinct de nitions (McCarthy and S. . Basically, since ist(c; p) will be analogous to c : p (namely, proposition p is given in context c) in natural deduction, the operation of entering c can be seen as assuming p in c. Entering c, inferring another proposition q from p (as a result of noticing p ! q, say), and leaving c will let one assert ist(c; q) in the outer context.
Logicists' works inspired by McCarthy
Guha (1991) models contexts with`microtheories' and uses them in Cyc, a largescale, highly modular commonsense reasoning program (Guha and Lenat 1994) . Microtheories are theories of limited domains. They have two basic properties: (i) there is a set of axioms related to each microtheory, and (ii) there is a vocabulary which tells us the syntax and semantics of each predicate and each function speci c to the microtheory. Di erent microtheories make di erent assumptions about the world. Similar to McCarthy's conception, they are interrelated via lifting rules stated in an outer context. Shoham (1991) uses the alternative notation p c to denote that assertion p holds in context c. Shoham's purpose is not really to o er a precise semantics for p c .
He is more interested in studying the interaction between modal operators (e.g., 
THE SITUATION THEORETIC APPROACH
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of information (Devlin 1991). Two of its primitive concepts are infons and situations. Infons are the basic units which embody discrete items of information. They are denoted as R; a 1 ; : : :; a n ; i , where R is an n-place relation, a 1 ; : : :; a n are objects appropriate for the respective argument places of R, and i is the polarity (1 if R holds, 0 if R does not hold).
A situation is a limited portion of the world (over some location and time), which can be picked out by a cognitive agent. It thus corresponds rather well to the intuitive meaning of`situation' in English. For example, the sentence \I solved a puzzle during the invited talk of Cooper" describes an activity performed at a particular time and location, individuated as the situation`the invited talk of Cooper.' Situations make certain infons factual. Using a notation deceptively hinting at rst-order logic, s is said to support (symbolically, s j = ) provided that is an infon that is true of situation s.
Abstract situations are the mathematical (albeit ontologically impoverished) counterparts of real situations, and unlike the latter, are amenable to symbolic manipulation. Given a real situation s, the set f j s j = g is taken to be the corresponding abstract situation. (This set will be nonwellfounded when s is a circular situation.
However, this need not concern us in this paper.) Let s be a given situation. Following the standard practice, we require the availability of some device for making reference to arbitrary objects of a given type 3 , viz. parameters. If _ x is a parameter and I is a nite set of infons (involving _ x), then there is a type _ x j s j = V 2I ]. This is the type of those objects to which _ x may be anchored 4 in s, so that all the conditions in I obtain. We refer to this process of obtaining a type|from a parameter _ x, a situation s, and a set I of infons|as type abstraction. Here _ x is the abstraction parameter and s is the`grounding' situation.
In situation theory, the ow of information is realized via constraints. We denote a constraint as S 1 ) S 2 (corresponding, in essence, to the infon involves; S 1 ; S 2 ; 1 , read`S 1 involves S 2 '), where S 1 and S 2 are situation types. Cognitively, if this relation holds, then it is a fact that if S 1 is realized (i.e., there is a real situation s 1 of type S 1 ), then so is S 2 (i.e., there is a real situation s 2 of type S 2 ). 
Towards a formalization of context in situation theory
Following , we will treat context as an amalgamation of a grounding situation and the rules which govern the relations within the context. Thus we will represent a context by a situation type that supports two kinds of infons: (i) factual infons to state facts, and (ii) constraints (which correspond to parametric conditionals) to capture the if-then relations holding within the context. Devlin 1991) . B is a set of background conditions under which C will convey information (rather than misinformation), and thus may pro tably be employed by a cognitive agent`attuned' to C. Basically, we have involves; S 1 ; S 2 ; 1 as long as the background conditions in B are met.
One such condition in our example may be as follows: 6 B j = kinsman; _ a; _ b; 0 Then it is enough simply that the conditions in B obtain under the particular circumstances, i.e., s j = kinsman; Acker; Sullivan; 0 . Thus, using s as a grounding situation with the anchoring f(_ a) = Acker and f( _ b) = Sullivan, we can infer, via C, that Acker must also be a member of Sullivan's jury.
After this example, let us review the desired properties of context, and check whether our proposal supports them.
Contexts vs. situations
During the review of McCarthy's work, we stated that contexts are rst-class objects, so that one can use them in the same way as other objects. In our approach, we are modeling contexts with situation types, and situation types are situations which have some unbound parameters. Other than having unbound parameters, situation types are ordinary situations, and thus rst-class objects of situation theory.
Richness of contexts was stated by McCarthy (1987 McCarthy ( , 1993 and Guha (1991) . A rich object cannot be de ned completely using extensional means. In situation theory, situations are, by de nition, rich objects (Devlin 1991). Clearly, the richness of situations leads to the partiality of contexts, as McCarthy advocates.
Another aspect of the use of context is the exibility of having private rules and presuppositions related to a particular point of view. In the logicist approach, 5 For simplicity, spatio-temporal coordinates _ l and _ t are omitted throughout the example. 6 For the sake of the argument, imagine another, bizarre academic regulation: if the advisor and the student are relatives|however distant|then the advisor cannot be in the jury. The rst line states that air is present in the environment (a presupposition), and the second line states that if something is a bird then it ies (a default rule). The same capability is also available in our notion of context. We represent the facts related to a particular context with parameter-free infons supported by the situation type which corresponds to the context. The rules of the context are represented by constraints. Therefore, we can use C below to correspond to c: S 1 = _ s j _ s j = bird; _ a; 1 ] S 2 = _ s j _ s j = flies; _ a; 1 ] B j = present; air; 1 ^ penguin; _ a; 0 ^ C = S 1 ) S 2 j B Here B is the set of conditions which render the default rule true. Barwise (1986, p. 124) points out to an intricate issue regarding such background conditions: \ T]he exact information content of a statement of a general conditional is] highly context dependent, which seems right. However, it might appear to be too context dependent, since it could happen that the exact information content is not even determined by what the speaker knows, in that he or she might not know what the relevant conditions B are." In our model, the context representation is designed to supply just the adequate background information, e.g., context de nes the domain of quanti cation. This property of context is due to its use as a grounding situation, so that in the binding of parameters, the only available objects are those available in the context.
REWORKING MCCARTHY'S LIFTING EXAMPLE
Lifting axioms are used to relate truth in one context to truth in another context. Since the vocabularies, languages, and assumptions of the source context and target context are usually di erent, these di erences need to be addressed during the lifting. Lifting needs to be as`meaning-preserving' as possible (Guha and Lenat 1994) and this makes it useful for NLP applications where preserving meaning is highly desirable, e.g., translation or natural language generation tasks. Consider the following simple scenario (Guha 1991, p. 35 ) which shows that a person interested in NLP should care about lifting:
Fred is standing in front of Chris. There is a ower pot to the left of Chris. Fred says \I like that ower pot to your left." Let this statement be F1 and the context in which this is uttered be C1. Chris then moves so that the ower pot is to his right and tells Fred that he did not hear what Fred just said and asks him to say it again. Fred wants to convey the same message in this new context (C2) but cannot use the same sentence (F1). The sentence which states the same thing in this new context is \I like that ower pot to your right." Call this second sentence F2. F1 states in C1 exactly what F2 states in C2. Given F1, C1, and C2, the process of obtaining F2 from F1 is called lifting F1 from C1 to C2.
In the remainder of this section, we will redo a lifting example due to McCarthy (1993) . The example, just like Guha's, is conceptually trivial but is illustrative of the technicalities lifting poses in general.
McCarthy considers two contexts, namely, Above-Theory (AT) and c. AT is the context which expresses a static theory of the blocks world predicates on and above, cf. equations 1 and 2. In AT, the notion of situation|in the sense of situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes 1969)|is not available. 7 However, we need to lift the results of AT to outer contexts that do involve situations|again in the sense of situation calculus|or times. The context c is such a context; it contains the theory of blocks world expressed using situation calculus, cf. equations 3, 4, and 5. For example, the predicate on(x; y) (of AT) becomes on(x; y; s) in c, where s denotes the situation in which on(x; y) holds. We want to use AT in c. In other words, c needs to relate its predicates on(x; y; s) and above(x; y; s) to predicates on(x; y) and above(x; y) of AT. This is realized by context ? of(s), a function giving a context which depends on the situation parameter s. Equations 3 and 4 associate a context context ? of (s) c : ist(context ? of(S 0 ); on(A; B)) (7) context ? of(S 0 ) : on(A; B) (8) c : ist(context ? of(S 0 ); 8x8y on(x; y) ! above(x; y)) (9) context ? of(S 0 ) : 8x8y on(x; y) ! above(x; y) (10) c : ist(context ? of(S 0 ); above(A; B)) (11) c : above(A; B; S 0 ) (12) Brie y, equation 6 is the assumption given in the problem statement. Equation 7 is obtained from equations 3 and 6 by plugging A for x, B for y, and S 0 for s. we obtain equation 10. From equations 8 and 10, we obtain equation 11. Now using equations 4 and 11 we arrive at equation 12. The desired conclusion immediately follows from equation 12.
This proof can be visualized as in Fig. 1 . In the gure, contexts are represented as Venn diagrams. Atomic formulas are represented with capital letters, and transfers between contexts are represented by arrows. We have labeled arrows in order to refer to the way the proof grows. Basically, McCarthy is drawing a virtual arrow from the atomic formula X to the atomic formula V . Since c has no rule to draw an arrow from X to V , he rst creates context ? of(S 0 ) and draws an arrow to the atomic formula Y using equation 3. After Y , McCarthy lifts the implication of above(x; y) from on(x; y) (the arrow labeled with 3 in the gure) to context ? of(S 0 ), i.e., he forms the arrow labeled with 6. Then from Y , by tracing this arrow, he gets to U. From U, by leaving context ? of(S 0 ), he concludes with the desired formula V .
In the proof of McCarthy, it would be more natural to use the path 1-2-3-4-5.
However, this path requires one more rule to transfer Y to Z (the arrow labeled with 2). In Attardi and Simi (1995) , this is explicitly stated and a proof is carried out with the mentioned path. In the following reworking of McCarthy's example, we will also follow the path 1-2-3-4-5. But rst some provisos: This completes the proof path 1-2-3-4-5. Using two anchoring functions (f 1 grounded at c c0 and f 2 grounded at c AT ), we have carried out the proof of McCarthy in our situation theoretic framework.
Let us emphasize the major idea in the above analysis. Basically, the logical reasoning of McCarthy is translated to an information-based reasoning, where the essential idea is to use the supports relation and constraints (with proper anchorings). It is noted that since a material equivalence, as in equations 3 and 4, can be written as a conjunction of two material implications, there are two symmetric constraints in each of equation blocks 15 and 16.
CONCLUSION
In the AI literature, there are a number of attempts towards a logical formalization of context. Our formal model of context di ers from these in being stated in the framework of situation theory (Devlin 1991). The comparison of previous works and the situation theoretic approach is summarized in Table 1 , where the rst row categorizes the language of formalization. Since our work is essentially an application of Barwise's ideas , no attempt is made in Table 1 to add an extra column corresponding to our approach.
Compared to other approaches, our proposal has two notable properties:
1. Dynamic contexts. We might easily require the contents of a context change dynamically. We can add (delete) assumptions and rules into (from) a context. Having a dynamic notion of context is not a novel thing for the logicist, since he or she can always modify a theory. However, when we fortify our context with constraints whose background conditions are also dynamic, we get nonmonotonicity in the framework of situation theory. 2. Natural language support. Situation theory adopts a more natural outlook regarding natural language concepts (Barwise and Perry 1983) . Thus, our approach might lead to simpler interfaces in NLP applications.
